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Abstract
We analyze the 2001 Argentine default on its foreign debt and its con-
sequences in terms of the existing literature on sovereign debt default.
It is our purpose to evaluate this experience and to see to what extent
the Argentine case requires a re-thinking on the nature and consequences
of defaults. We show that the Argentine case contradicts many of the
standard predictions, in particular its posterior lack of access to inter-
national credit, restriction to international trade and negative economic
growth. Moreover, it corroborates the historical fact that many defaulters
“get away with it.”
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1 Introduction
Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt in December 2001. Many analysts
thought this would lead the country into a long period of stagnation and
would make it a pariah in the world’s financial markets for a long period
of time. This did not occur. It is our purpose to analyze this experience and
to see to what extent the Argentine experience requires a re-thinking on the
nature and consequences of defaults.
In this article we shall first examine the general views that have prevailed
concerning the impact of a default of the sovereign debt. Next we review
the policies implemented in Argentina during the 1990s and the subsequent
collapse of the political and economic regime in 2001-2002. This will be fol-
lowed by an analysis of the Argentinean experience with its default in the
period 2001 – 2005 and its subsequent consequences. We also review the debt
restructuring process that occurred during those years. In a final part, we
shall speculate on the lessons which can be drawn from this experience and
the extent to which the existing perception of the nature and consequences of
defaults might have to be amended.
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2 Default on Sovereign Debt: definition, causes and
consequences
A sovereign debt default occurs when a country does not meet a debt pay-
ment (principal or interest), i.e. it fails to meet the terms of a contractual
agreement. A country that repudiates its debt faces the threat of sanctions
such as loss of access to short term trade credits and seizure of assets. In
practice, however, the observed punishment does not correspond to what the
theory predicts. Bulow& Rogoff (1989a) state that whereas domestic loans are
supported by substantial collateral, the assets that can be appropriated in the
event of sovereign’s default are negligible. There are also many uncertainties
surrounding the actual damage that a lender can inflict to a defaulting country
(see Bulow & Rogoff (1989b) for a discussion on the legal environment). For
instance, Lindert & Morton (1989), (p.231) examine historical consequences
of default episodes and conclude that “The majority of non repayers escaped
punishment.” Then they argue that (p.234): “(. . . ) defaulting governments
have seldom been punished, either with direct sanctions or with discrimina-
tory denial of later credit.”
In fact, the correct incentives for avoiding default are not associated with
the collateral damage but with the country’s reputation. Eaton & Gersovitz
(1981) argue that a country’s incentive to make repayments is to preserve its
future access to international credit markets (for a review of the importance of
reputation see Eaton & Fernandez (1995)) and international trade. Moreover,
defaulting on sovereign debt may undermine the country’s capacity to obtain
beneficial deals in multi-lateral organizations.
As surveyed in Rose (2002), losses in trade are perhaps the most impor-
tant punishment a country may receive after defaulting on its debt. Kaletsky
(1985, pp 36-38) argues: “The interruption of trade finance might turn out
to be the heaviest penalty for a defaulter. Trade finance is a critical issue be-
cause most trade is conducted on a credit basis of one kind or another (...)
trade finance could be the ‘Achilles heel’ of a default strategy.” Consistent
with this, Cohen (1991, p. 1) states: “A defaulting country first loses access to
its trade credit. Trade, in general, becomes difficult, exporting is tricky, and so
is paying for its imports.” Rogoff (1999, p. 31) writes “The strongest weapon
of disgruntled creditors, perhaps, is the ability to interfere with short-term
credits that are the lifeblood of international trade.”
A default can have lasting effects on the country’s economic growth, trade
and the financial sector. Rose (2002) estimates that a default episode may pro-
duce bilateral trade to fall 8 percent a year for about 15 years. Sturzenegger
(2002) when looking at the output costs of the defaults in the 1980s finds that
the average cumulative drop is of about 4 percent over the 4 years immedi-
ately following a default.
Reinhart et al. (2003) show that the chances of future default increase with
past default occurrences. These authors introduce the term “debt intolerance”
as the extreme duress that emerging markets face at debt levels that are quite
manageable for the standards of industrial economies. Therefore, default can
become a way of life. As a consequence, the country will have to pay extremely
high interest rates for moderate amount of debt.
Why do countries default? Chuhan & Sturzenegger (2003) distinguish
three theoretical different causes: (a) liquidity problem (only a cash flow prob-
lem); (b) sustainability problem (the country may never be able to service its
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debt out of its own resources); and (c) unwillingness to pay (a country decides
to stop paying it well before it is insolvent). However, ultimately the decision
of defaulting resides in the political sphere. On this topic, Bordon & Ooster-
linck (2005) show a very interesting approach. Their premise is that the deci-
sion to default is a political one, and therefore political variables may also play
a crucial role in understanding the decision to default. Their article suggests
that defaulting governments may be politically punished for their poor han-
dling of the debt. They found that the likelihood of coups seems higher after
a debt default, even when one controls for some political variables. However,
in several instances governments manage to “get away with it”. They suggest
that in these cases, it is either too hard to overthrow the ruling government
or that defaulting on the external debt is perceived by the local electors as
less harmful than alternative tighter macroeconomic measures. The cheerful
celebration of the 2001 Argentine default by the Argentine Congress certainly
shows that the case studied in this paper should be analyzed in these terms.
The fact that defaulting episodes are common also suggests that losses for
the defaulter are not big enough. Chuhan & Sturzenegger (2003) state that
the welfare effects of the default are unambiguous: on the one hand there
are output contractions and financial crises; on the other hand it alleviates
the fiscal situation because debt payment falls. Zame (1993) even provides a
theoretical justification of defaulting: This paper argues that default plays an
important positive role in the economy. If markets are incomplete and traders
are only able to enter into contracts that they will be able to execute regardless
of future events, contingent contracting may be severely restricted. Moreover,
opening new markets may not relieve these restrictions. Default promotes
efficiency in a way that opening new markets does not, by making it possible
for traders to enter into contracts that they will be able to execute with high
probability but not with certainty.
Why do, then, markets lend to countries that defaulted? An explanation
is found in the procyclical nature of capital markets that lent vast sums to
emerging markets in boom periods (associated with low returns in industri-
alized countries). In fact, it may be argued that lenders are paid accordingly
for the risk they take. However, it is this same process that produces “sudden
stops” in borrowing countries, and that triggers default episodes.
Grossman&Huyck (1988) introduce the term “excusable default”, defined
as those defaults triggered by bad shocks. Both creditors and debtors have
incentives to renegotiate, and theoretical results show that it is better to have
a debt relief (or partial default) than a total disruption of debt. The incentives
of lenders and borrowers to reschedule or restructure debt obligations are
quite different. The incentive for the lenders is to recover as much value as
possible of the defaulted debt (provided that the penalty, in terms of seizure
of assets, is much smaller than the amount defaulted). The incentive from the
borrowers view point is to minimize the output and other economic costs of a
default.
3 An historical account of default episodes
Historical evidence suggests that foreign lending to sovereigns has generally
been characterized by cycles of boom and bust, and associated debt crises.
Lindert & Morton (1989) find that periods of recurrent debt crises periods
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include the 1820’s, 1870’s, 1890’s, 1930’s and 1980’s, which usually followed
a wave of international lending, like the British lending spurt of the 1850’s
to finance railroads in Latin America, the wave of European financing to Ar-
gentina in the 1880’s, the US led bond financing boom of the late 1920’s, and
the bank lending spurt of the recycled petro-dollars after the first shock of
1973.
Many countries that have defaulted on their external debts have done
so repeatedly. Including the most recent episode, Argentina has defaulted
5 times since 1824 (Beim & Calomiris n.d.), repeatedly in every default cy-
cle. This is not an exclusive characteristic of Argentina provided that other
countries in the region have defaulted on a similar number of occasions. For
instance, Brazil and Colombia has done it 7 times while Venezuela 9 times.
Reinhart et al. (2003) calculate that Argentina was in a state of default or re-
structuring 25% of the time in the period 1824-1999, a similar number applies
for Brazil, while an even higher percentage (38%) occurred in Colombia and
Venezuela. Standard and Poor’s survey of default episodes1 finds 84 events of
sovereign default on private-source debt between 1975 and 2002.
If this historical account tells anything is that defaulting is not new. How-
ever, the latest Argentine case in 2001 has some distinctive characteristic that
puts it in the Guiness record of the default history: it was the largest in the
history of international bonds with over $82 billion.
4 The Collapse of the Currency Board and the Argentine Default
In order to end what had become as a chronic situation of hyperinflation,
Argentina introduced a currency board in 1991, the so-called Convertibilidad.
Among its major features were: 1) the introduction of a new currency, the
peso (which amounted 10,000 Australes), which was set at an exchange rate
of one peso to one U.S. dollar, and which was perfectly convertible; 2) a new
law was introduced which permitted the Central Bank to issue new pesos only
against new foreign exchange reserves. The Convertibilidad had many aspects
of a dollarization: contracts made in dollars acquired the same status as those
made in the local currency (including bank deposits and credits, see below).
Table 2 shows the positive results of the Convertibilidad regime – inflation
came to an end, there was an initial period of high growth rates, and, as shown
in Table 3, there was a substantial surge in capital inflows. This new regime
did not prohibit the state from having budget deficits. However, such deficits
could not be financed by the Central Bank, but only through borrowing. Much
of the latter consisted of foreign borrowing.
The first two columns of Table 1 present a fact that was characteristic dur-
ing the Convertibility: the Public Sector had, on average, primary fiscal sur-
pluses, except on the years when external shocks affected the economy, i.e. the
1995 tequila effect and the Russian crisis of 1998. However, the public sector
continued to be in deficit. There are two main explanations for this primary
fiscal surplus with fiscal deficit: 1) the payments of the debt services, which
grew from approximately 4% of the GDP around 1993 to more than 10% by
the end of the decade and 2) the need to finance the social security system with
1Standard and Poor’s definition of a default episode includes any missed principal and/or
interest payment as well as outright repudiation. There is thus considerable variation in the
severity of the default episodes.
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pesos, as most of the young taxpayers had transferred to the private system. In
1994 the Argentine government partially privatized the public pay-as-you-go
social security system that had been in existence since 1967. This decision was
strongly promoted and supported by the World Bank and the IMF and had a
major impact on Argentina’s fiscal accounts. Cibils & Rubén (2007) argue that
the lost of revenue, plus accumulated interest costs, amounted to nearly the
entire government budget deficit in 2001.
As a by product of the Convertibilidad the Argentine economy was espe-
cially vulnerable to foreign crises. The Asian crisis caused capital to flow out
and the Brazilian devaluation made the trade deficit worse. As dollars were
flowing out of the currency board, the decline of the dollar reserves reduced
the money supply and raised interest rates, which again worsened the reces-
sion.
It is noted in Table 2 that the growth rate of Argentina’s GDP began to
slow down in 1998 and in 1999 it began to experience a negative growth rate,
which would last until 2003. The most pronounced decline occurred in 2001
and 2002, when the country experience the collapse of the currency board
system. This decline in growth also produced dramatic increases in poverty.
For instance, unemployment grew from 13.2% in 1998 to 21.5% in 2002; the
proportion of the population living below the poverty line grew from 35.9%
in 1998 to 57.5% in 2002. Moreover the rate of investment, which was already
declining in the late 1990s, took a plunge from 1999 on, dropping from 19.1
percent of GDP to 11.3 percent in 2002.
By the time of De la Rua’s government, there was a consensus among
economists that devaluation was imperative. Policymakers hesitated due to
the perceived financial and political risks involved and the De la Rua’s govern-
ment elected in 1999 adhered to the view that the main problem was not the
exchange rate appreciation but fiscal deficit. This vision led the government
to have a tight fiscal policy with the expectation that fiscal adjustment would
entail lower risk premiums and consequently interest rates, which in turn
would reduce the debt service payments, one of the principal components of
the public expenditure. However, these policies reinforced the recessionary
trend and undermine market confidence in the viability of the Convertibili-
dad.
By the second half of 2001 the public began to fear the possibility of deval-
uation and there was increasing speculation against the peso. The situation
was worsened by a unique feature of the Convertibilidad. In particular, local
banks were able to offer deposits in foreign currency to the general public,
and the Central Bank guaranteed that these were secured. Therefore the peso
speculation converted into a bank run, as the public withdrew their savings
from foreign-based accounts into cash.
In order to sustain the Convertibilidad, the government established severe
restrictions on capital movements and cash withdrawals from banks in De-
cember (named the “corralito”). This measure infuriated the general public
and produced massive social unrest and political commotion. To avoid a mas-
sive peso withdrawal from the banks the government declared a bank holiday
on December 20th, which lasted until January 3rd, 2002. The collapse of the
De la Rua’s government and the successive governments led to the abandon-
ment of the currency board. Moreover, the Duhalde government decided to
compulsively convert foreign-currency bank deposits into pesos at a rate of
1.4 pesos per dollar when the market rate was 2 and even reached 4 pesos per
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dollar (this set of measures is known as the “corralón”). Additionally, to avoid
a generalized bankruptcy bank credits in dollars were converted at a rate of
one-to-one rate.
On December 24th the service payments of a significant part of the public
debt were suspended (it initially affected 61.8 billion dollars in public bonds
and 8 in other debt instruments). It did not include debt contracted with mul-
tilateral institutions (such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank) of about 32.4 billion dollars and recently issued guaran-
teed loans (42.3 billions). This turned out to be the largest default in Latin
American economic history, as the foreign private debt amounted to US$ 82
billion out of US$ 153 billion.
5 The Resurrection of Argentine’s Economy: 2003- 2006
Argentina’s recovery from these economic depths was due in large part to the
improvement in the trade balance. It will be noted in Table 2 that it went
from being negative in the late 1990s to a surplus in 2000, and this surplus
rose dramatically in the subsequent years. The surplus was the result of two
factors. First, the country’s exports, which hardly ever declined, rose substan-
tially, as a result of both a strong world demand for the country’s products,
and also the substantial devaluation of the peso. Second, there was a dra-
matic decline of imports, due to both the rise of poverty levels and the decline
of investments.
The Argentinean default could have not occurred at a better time: the de-
fault itself eliminated one of the principal components of the public deficit,
that is, the need to pay huge sums as interest on the debt, and by 2002 the
prices of the Argentinean exports were rising dramatically.
Overall the collapse of the Argentine financial system did not have any
significant effect on international trade. The fact that there was not disruption
after the default may be explained by the fact that Argentine’s exports were
concentrated on traditional agricultural markets and primary goods with well
established financial services and prices on the rise, or tied to the Mercosur
with politically managed quotas. As a result, the process was one of a classical
competitive devaluation, and this superseded the negative financial effects of
the default.
The strong growth of exports also strengthened the finances of the govern-
ment, as the major export items were taxed (retentions). In fact, the govern-
ment’s budget had a surplus from 2003 on. However, as in the case of gov-
ernment revenues, the level of expenditures also expanded, which, in turn,
contributed to economic expansion.
The devaluation of the currency did not produce an immediate rise in the
level of prices, mostly due to the existing high unemployment rate and to the
freeze of public utilities’ prices and other price controls introduced by the
Duhalde and (mainly) Kirchner governments. Damill et al. (2005) attributes
the economic recovery to the achievement of a new macroeconomic equilib-
rium. Those authors stress that the policies implemented were different from
those common in the 1990s. In particular the new governments imposed new
exchange rules that compelled exporters to liquidate dollars in the local mar-
ket and imposed capital controls. In fact these measures were so successful
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that the Central Bank was compelled to absorb the excess of foreign currency
to avoid the appreciation of the peso.
6 The debt restructuring process
The extra premium paid by Argentine bonds (the so-called ‘riesgo-país’) sig-
nificantly influenced the Menem and De la Rua’s governments’ decisions. As
financial markets disbelieved the country’s capacity to repay its foreign debt,
those governments introduced tighter fiscal policies. However, following the
contractionary policies, markets offered a higher discount on those bonds,
which in fact worsened the country’s financial situation. Figure 1 shows the
evolution of this variable for the period under analysis. As expected, the de-
fault is followed by an exorbitant spike in this series.
Negotiations with bondholders, which began in 2002, dragged on until
June 2005, when President Nestor Kirchner made an offer which consisted
of the exchange of old bonds for new ones (for an excellent review of the
negotiation process see Damill et al. (2005). The new bonds amounted to 25%
of the value of the old debt. Kirchner made it clear that this offer was not
negotiable and he gave bondholders one month to accept or reject the offer.
Within that time 76% of the bondholders accepted the offer. The remaining
24%were not repaid and as of 2007 were still trying to regain their investment
through foreign legal actions.
Mortimore & Stanley (2006) pointed out that the unilateral offer was indi-
rectly supported by the other actors’ inaction and lack of initiative, together
with extraordinarily good international conditions. Both the IMF and devel-
oped countries’ governments adopted a laissez-faire approach to the sovereign
crisis resolution. Moreover, the low interest rates in the United States, and the
narrowing of emerging bond spreads improved the conditions of the offer.
The government also took for granted the position of local financial investors
(mostly retirement and pension administrators who were obliged to invest a
certain proportion of their capital in public bonds) which provided a “floor
of acceptance” of about 30 percent. Those authors also point out that the Ar-
gentinean government had a strong bargaining position due to the atomicity
of the shareholders and the coordination problems among them.
7 The Argentinean Default in Historical Perspective
How did the recent Argentinean default and its aftermath conform to default
literature which we reviewed at the beginning of this essay?
Immediate Sanctions.
Most studies have found that the governments of defaulting countries have
assets abroad whose value is small (such as embassy buildings and small im-
plements of diplomacy). In the case of Argentina the value of such assets is
minuscule compared to the country’s foreign debt. Threat of sanctions and
seizure of assets occurred only rarely. In the case of the recent Argentine de-
fault some bondholders tried to take legal actions in the courts of Stateplace-
New York in order to attach Argentinean Central Bank funds in the New York
Federal Reserve. However, it proved difficult for them to convince the courts.
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The latter held that since Argentinean funds belonged to Argentina’s Central
Bank, which was considered an entity separate from the Argentinean govern-
ment, the claims had to be denied.2
Future Sanctions.
Another type of sanction is the loss of access to international credit. Table 6
contains the amount of international credit and the premium it had to pay in
the years 1991 to 2006. It will be noted that the amount of credit declined
dramatically in 2001 and reached a low point in 2005 (there is no informa-
tion for 2002 to 2004 because the country was in total default and there were
no financial operations). Credit began to flow in again in 2005 and by 2006
reaching the levels of 1994-5. Thus these type of sanctions were of short du-
rations, and one can conclude that the evidence shows a myopic view of the
default.
It should also be noted in Table 5 that net foreign credit to Argentina began
to decline before the default. The table shows that net foreign portfolio invest-
ment dropped from US$ 11 billion in 1998 to US$ 8.7 billion in 1999 and to
US$ -6.8 billion in 2000. Although the decline in 2002 can be interpreted
as reflecting the default, this is not the case of the previous years. Thus the
declining in the inflow of portfolio capital cannot be solely blamed in the de-
fault, but rather on the deterioration of the economic situation and especially
the increased evidence of the lack of sustainability of the Convertibilidad.
An important point to be made is that the end of the Convertibilidad en-
tirely changes the dependence of Argentina on foreign capital. During the
1990s the emission of debt was mainly associated with the necessity of ac-
quiring foreign reserves to maintain the currency board and the payment of
interest. After 2002, both conditions disappeared, and this gave the Argentine
government more room to negotiate.
Impact on Growth and Trade
Table 2 indicates that the default had little impact on either growth or trade,
where the theory predicts the biggest consequences of a default. The dramatic
decline of growth in the years 2001-2 was a direct consequence of the collapse
of the currency board, and it can be claimed that the default was the result of
the crisis rather than the cause of it. The default may not be separated from
the deep economic recession and regime’s collapse, and therefore its specific
contribution may be difficult to quantify. In addition, the resumption of spec-
tacular rates of growth in 2003 had little to do with the default. As far as
trade is concerned, exports stayed at about the same level in the years 1997
– 2002, while dramatically rising in the years 2003-2006. As far as imports
are concerned, their decline began in 1998, plunging in 2002, but recovered
rapidly after 2003. Import declines cannot be explained by a lack of credit
related to the default, but rather by the dramatic decline of the GDP, the de-
cline of investments and the spurt in import prices due to the devaluation of
the currency.
In addition, the default did not reduce foreign direct investment (FDI),
which was a feared consequence. Table 5 shows that even in the worse time of
2United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, August Term, 2006. Docket Nos.
06-0403-cv, 06-0405-cv, 06-0406-cv.
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the crisis, that is 2002, FDI , though substantially lower, never disappeared.
Also, the collapse of the financial system should certainly not be attributed to
the default but to the non-sustainability of the Convertibilidad. The internal fi-
nancial system recovered very fast after the new macroeconomic equilibrium
was put into place. Moreover, when the debt restructuring process was final-
ized, the ‘riesgo-país’ reached the same level of 1997, the golden years of the
Convertibilidad (see Figure 1). Again, this shows that markets may be more
myopic than what the literature on defaulting debt believes.
It thus seems that what led to the disaster of 2001-2 was due to inter-
nal problems: the lack of an internal adjustment to accompany the currency
board, which led to an untenable external debt situation. The default was a
“way out” and Argentina got away with it due to the favorable external con-
ditions, leading to huge trade surpluses, which led to growth and the growth
led to a softening of the country’s bad international reputation in the credit
markets. The default could certainly not have been declared at a better time.
Also, the fact that Argentina was smart enough not to default with the
multilateral institutions was crucial because this line of credit remained open
and the Argentine government made the announcement regarding the debt
restructuring proposals at the annual meetings of the IMF and theWorld Bank
(the Dubai proposal, September 2003).
The Argentine default can also be interpreted in terms of Grossman &
Huyck (1988) term “excusable default”: Argentina was in a very deep reces-
sion and in order to maintain the Convertibilidad and pay the foreign debt,
contractionary monetary policies were needed which would have made the
political situation unsustainable. In the same line of thought, Mortimore and
Mortimore & Stanley (2006) state that democratic governments, when con-
fronted with a social crisis, put their electorate before their investors. More-
over, in terms of Zame (1993) analysis, where contractual debt obligations
could not be changed, the default offered the possibility of a renegotiation of
the debt with a capital and interest flow in the range of the country’s possibil-
ities.
Was the default really necessary? As can be seen in Table 4, it dramatically
alleviated the government’s burden, as debt servicing as a proportion of total
government expenditures declined to 9.2% in 2004. However, the servicing
of the debt might have been quite manageable in an expansionary period.
Chuhan and Sturzenegger (2002) suggest that how the default is implemented
is not independent of the motives of the default. These authors suggest that
countries with unwillingness to pay are more inclined to broad-based default.
However, the fact that the default was done in a climate of political turmoil,
mostly as a reaction to the failure of the policies implemented in the previous
decade showed that the default was an immediate necessity rather than an
unwillingness to recognize the debt. It was celebrated by the Congress as a
political triumph with the expectation that it was necessary to avoid further
macroeconomic restrictions. In a framework of fiscal, financial and political
crisis, defaulting on foreign creditors was a short-term fiscal alleviation whose
consequences would be the responsibility of an unknown future government.
In terms of the Bordon & Oosterlinck (2005) analysis of whether govern-
ments “get away with it,” it should be noted that the temporary president who
followed De la Rua and who was responsible for formally declaring the debt
default, Rodolfo Rodriguez Saa, may have been punished by a crash in his
political aspirations at the national level.
140 Baer, Margot, Montes-Rojas Economia Aplicada, v.15, n.1
Table 1: Argentina: Fiscal Deficit and Foreign Debt
Primary Fiscal Deficit,
National Public Sector
without provinces
(in millions of pesos of
2004)
Fiscal Deficit, National
Public Sector without
provinces
(in millions of pesos of
2004)
Foreign Debt
(In millions of U.S.$)
1990 11347.0 17458.1 -
1991 −118.2 5710.5 -
1992 −7388.6 1961.5 -
1993 −6607.5 65.1 -
1994 843.7 1267.7 87524
1995 4383.8 13589.7 101462
1996 6041.2 15385.4 114423
1997 −4192.4 7866.7 129964
1998 −1177.8 13057.4 147634
1999 5836.8 23665.1 152563
2000 −3932.4 17117.2 155014
2001 9769.8 35049.0 166272
2002 −7037.7 3108.0 156748
2003 −15737.1 −6322.4 164645
2004 −23253.4 −15851.4 171205
2005 −11169.8 −8384.6 113804
2006 −14762.0 −9420.7 107818
Source: Secretaria de Hacienda, Ministerio de Economía.
8 Conclusions
The Argentine default provides a very important framework to evaluate the
literature on sovereign debt default. The lessons that this experience gives us
should be used to evaluate the possible consequences of other future defaults.
Two important points need to be made, which are special features of the
Argentine case. First, Argentina faced several favorable conditions in the af-
termath of the 2002 economic crisis. The abandonment of the currency board
alleviated the government’s dependence on foreign capital and placed the
country on a positive growth path that lasted several years. Moreover the
country’s terms of trade entered in a favorable phase which significantly con-
tributed to the economic growth. Second, the fact that the default was de-
clared concurrently with a catastrophic economic, political and social crisis
reduced its significance and it made multilateral institutions more sympa-
thetic to the Argentine government debt restructuring process.
Even when it is impossible to isolate the effect of the default from other
concurrent episodes, the evidence points to the fact that the long lasting neg-
ative effects predicted by the literature were not present in this case.
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Table 2: Argentina: GDP Growth and the Trade Balance
GDP
Growth
Rate
Investment/
GDP Ratio*
Exports** Imports** Trade Balance**
1993 8.06 19.1 13269 17133 3864
1994 5.84 20.5 16023 21675 5652
1995 2.85 18.3 21162 20200 962
1996 5.53 18.9 24043 23855 188
1997 8.11 20.6 26431 30450 4019
1998 3.85 21.1 26434 31377 4943
1999 3.39 19.1 23309 25508 2199
2000 0.79 17.9 26341 25281 1060
2001 4.41 15.8 26543 20320 6223
2002 10.89 11.3 25561 8990 16571
2003 8.84 14.3 29939 13851 16088
2004 9.03 17.7 34576 22445 12131
2005 9.18 19.8 40106 28689 11417
2006 8.90 21.6 46275 39530 6745
Source:INDEC.
* 1993 prices
**millions of US $
Table 3: Unemployment
May October
1998 13.2 12.4
1999 14.5 13.8
2000 15.4 14.7
2001 16.4 18.3
2002 21.5 17.8
2003 19.1 15.4
2004 14.6 12.6
2005 12.5 10.6
2006 10.9 9.5
Source:INDEC.
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Table 4: Percent of Households and Per-
sons Living Below Poverty Line
Households Persons
May 2001 26.2 35.9
October 2001 28.0 38.3
May 2002 41.4 53.0
October 2002 45.7 57.5
May 2003 42.6 54.7
October 2003 36.5 47.8
May 2004 33.5 44.3
October 2004 29.8 40.2
May 2005 28.8 38.9
October 2005 24.7 33.8
May 2006 23.1 31.4
Source:INDEC.
Table 5: Argentina: Capital Flows Debt Servicing and Reserves
(millions of US $)label
Net Capital
Flows
Debt Service
In millions
of 2004
pesos
Debt
Service as
% of Total
Public Ex-
penditures
Foreign
Ex-
change
Reserves
1993 14196 5120.7 4.29 17393
1994 13781 5995.9 4.63 17922
1995 7701 7823.6 6.32 18506
1996 12249 7576.0 6.12 21578
1997 17709 10151.1 7.80 24633
1998 18354 11850.4 8.52 27867
1999 13772 15010.1 10.04 28765
2000 8732 20302.5 13.85 28260
2001 −5442 23942.1 15.67 18398
2002 −11404 9050.6 9.61 10476
2003 −3203 6478.9 6.46 14119
2004 2022 4563.5 4.05 19646
2005 3013 6338.4 5.33 28077
2006 −5629 6320.0 4.55 32037
2007 NA NA NA 43002*
* As of September 18, 2007.
a Source: INDEC; Secretaria de Hacienda, Ministerio de Economia
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Table 6: FDI and Foreign Portfolio
Foreign Direct
Investment*
Foreign Portfolio
Investment*
1991 2439.0 483.0
1992 4431.0 4860.1
1993 2793.1 34402.5
1994 3634.9 9461.3
1995 5609.4 2313.5
1996 6948.5 9594.2
1997 9160.3 11024.4
1998 7290.7 8787.8
1999 23987.7 −6784.9
2000 10418.3 −2583.6
2001 2166.1 −9503.3
2002 2148.9 −4640.3
2003 1652.0 −7758.1
2004 4124.7 −9415.6
2005 5265.2 −670.5
2006 5491.0 6531.6
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistical
Yearbook
* In millions of US $
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